Lecture 17 - Optimum Currency Areas and the Euro Experience by Figini, Paolo
Lecture 17 – Internatinaa Ecinimics
Optmum Currencyu Areas and  the Euripean 
Experience
Preview
• Policy Coordinaton in an open economy: fexible vs. fxed rates
• The European Union
• The European Monetary System
• Policies of the EU and the EMU
• Theory of optmal currency areas
• Is the EU an optmal currency area?
• The future of the EU
Piaicyu Ciird inatin in an ipen ecinimyu
• Any movement in the real exchange rate of a country implies a syummetric 
ippisite change in foreign exchange rates 
– Domestc policies (of big countries) afect other countries’ goals
– Foreign policies afect domestc targets.
– Targets are: internaa baaance (full employment and price stability) and 
externaa baaance (current account and/or balance of payments)
– The impact depends on the type of exchange rate system (fxed vs. 
fexible)
• Need for Internatinaa Ciird inatin and  Ciiperatin
– Gold Standard, Gold Exchange Standard (fxed  rates)
– World system of fexible exchange rates and local experiences of fxed 
rates (currencyu uniins and  pegging)
Piaicyu Ciird inatin in an ipen ecinimyu (2)
• Flexible exchange rates: pros and cons. 
• PROS:
– Monetary policy autonomy
– Symmetry
– Exchange rates as automatc stabilizers
• CONS:
– Infatonary policies and lost of discipline
– Destabilizing speculaton and fnancial disturbances
– Volatlity and uncertainty which jeopardize internatonal trade
– Uncoordinated economic policies
– The illusion of greater autonomy
The Euripean Uniin
• The European Union is a system of supranatonal insttutons (evolved  
from internatonal treates, the frst of which originated in 1957) which 
now represents 28 European countries through the following bodies:
– Euripean Paraiament: elected by citzens of member countries
– Ciuncia if the Euripean Uniin: appointed by governments
of the member countries – executve body
– Euripean Cimmissiin: executve body too
– Ciurt if Justce: interprets EU law
– Euripean Centraa Bank, which conducts monetary policy through a 
system of member country banks called the Euripean Syustem if 
Centraa Banks
Membership if the EU
• To be a member of the EU, a country must, among other things:
– have low barriers that limit trade and fows of fnancial assets;
– adopt common rules for circulaton of workers to ease the movement of 
people;
– establish common workplace safety and consumer protecton rules;
– establish certain politcal and legal insttutons that are consistent with 
the EU’s defniton of liberal democracy.
 It is a aing pricess, which historically has been guided more by politcal goals 
than economic goals (e.g. Eastern Europe countries)
 Complex rules and complex bureaucracy which have led the EU away from 
the citzens
Whyu the EU?
• Countries that established the EU had several goals
– To enhance Europe’s piwer in internatinaa afairs: as a union of 
countries, the EU could represent more economic and politcal power 
in the world.
– To make Europe a unifed  market: a large market with free trade, free 
fows of fnancial assets, and free migraton of people—in additon to 
fxed exchange rates or a common currency—was believed to foster 
economic growth and economic well-being.
– To make Europe piaitcaaayu stabae and  peacefua.
The Euripean Minetaryu Syustem
• Coordinaton of monetary policies has always been one of the main pillars of 
the European economic policy.
• It originally started as Euripean Minetaryu Syustem (EMS)
• The European Monetary System was originally a system of fxed  exchange 
rates implemented in 1979 through an exchange rate mechanism (ERM).
• The EMS has since developed into an ecinimic and  minetaryu uniin (EMU), 
a more extensive system of coordinated economic and monetary policies.
– The EMU has replaced the exchange rate mechanism for most members 
with a common currency under the economic and monetary union.
– Not all the EU countries are members of the EMU either because they do 
not want (e.g Sweden) or do not meet yet criteria (e.g. Croata).
– There are also external countries adoptng the Euro (e.g. Montenegro) or 
pegging the local currency to the Euro completely (e.g. Bosnia) or 
partally (e.g. Belarus).
Members if the EU and  if the EMU
The EMS 1979–1998
• From 1979 to 1993, the EMS defned an exchange rate mechanism to allow 
most currencies to fuctuate +/– 2.25% around target exchange rates 
among the system.
• The exchange rate mechanism allowed larger fuctuatons (+/– 6%) for 
currencies of Portugal, Spain, Britain (untl 1992) and Italy (untl 1990).
– These countries wanted greater fexibility with monetary policy and the 
wider bands were intended to prevent speculaton caused by difering 
monetary / fscal policies.
 To prevent speculaton, early in the EMS some exchange controls were 
also enforced to limit trading of currencies.
 But from 1987 to 1990 these controls were lifed in order to make the EU 
a cimmin market fir fnanciaa assets.
The EMS 1979–1998 (2) 
• Because of diferences in monetary and fscal policies and in economic 
performances across the EMS, market partcipants began buying German assets 
(because of high German interest rates) and selling other EMS assets.
• As a result, Britain aef the EMS in 1992 and allowed the pound to foat against other 
European currencies.
• Hence, the exchange rate mechanism was redefned in 1993 to allow for bands of 
+/–15% of the target value in order to allow devaluaton of many currencies relatve 
to the German mark.
• Eventually, each EMS member adopted similarly fscal and monetary policies, and 
the infaton rates in the EMS eventually converged (and speculaton slowed or 
stopped).
• In efect, EMS members were following the restrained monetary policies of 
Germany, which has traditonally had low infaton: under the EMS exchange rate 
mechanism of fxed bands, Germanyu was “expirtng” its minetaryu piaicyu.
Infatin Cinvergence fir Six 
Originaa EMS Members, 1978–2009
Source: CPI inflation rates from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Tiward s the EMU: the Maastricht Criteria 
• The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, aimed at transforming the EMS in a 
currencyu uniin, with own currency (the Euro) and own Central Bank (ECB)
• It is a fundamental transfer if sivereigntyu power to a supernatonal insttuton
• Some EU/EMS members have not ratfed all of the clauses and have opted-out
• The Maastricht Treaty requires that members that want to enter the economic 
and monetary union have to satsfy the following criteria (Maastricht criteria):
– Atain exchange rate stabiaityu before adoptng the euro (+/-2.5% band);
– Atain price stabiaityu: a maximum infaton rate of 1.5% above the average of 
the three lowest natonal infaton rates among EU members;
– Atain fnanciaa stabiaityu: a maximum interest rate of 2% above the average of 
the three lowest natonal rates among EU members
– Atain bud get stabiaityu: a maximum rato of government defcit to GDP of 3%.
– And a maximum rato of government debt to GDP of 60%-
The Griwth and  Stabiaityu Pact
• The Maastricht Treaty requires that members that want to remain in the 
EMU maintain a restrictve and  ciird inated  fscaa piaicyu: 
– a maximum rato of government defcit to GDP of 3%.
– a maximum rato of government debt to GDP of 60%.
– Financial penaltes are imposed on countries with “excessive” 
defcits or debt.
• The monetary criteria are not in the Stability Pact because, in the EMU, 
monetary policy is not anymore in the control of member states.
• Aimed at peer-pressure in order to avoid expirt if bad  piaicies.
• The Stability Pact is based on the idea that government budget stability 
is a fundamental preconditon for growth.
• Afer the crisis the Pact has changed to correct and to adapt to the new 
economic conditon.
Whyu the Euri (EMU)?
● EU members adopted the euro for 4 main reasons:
● Unifed  market: the belief that greater market integraton and 
a common market would need a common currency.
● Piaitcaa stabiaityu: the belief that a common currency would 
unify politcal interests and provide more stability.
● Cimmin visiin: The belief that natonal interests wiuad  be 
mid erated  under a European System of Central Banks.
● Eaiminatin if the pissibiaityu if d evaauatins / revaauatins: 
with free movement of fnancial assets, capital fight and 
speculaton could occur in an EMS with separate 
currencies, but it would be more difcult for them to occur 
in an EMS with a single currency.
The Exchange Rate Mechanism
• The Euro was introduced in 1999 but natonal currencies contnued to 
circulate for other three years only nominally, with fxed  parityu against 
the EURO and  with minetaryu authirityu transferred  ti the ECB.
• From 1 January 2002 the Euro replaced the natonal currencies in 
circulaton.
• The previous exchange rate mechanism (ERM) became obsolete in 1999 
but a new exchange rate mechanism (ERM 2) was established between 
the EMU and outside currencies.
– It allowed countries (either within or outside of the EU) that wanted 
to enter the EMU in the future to maintain stable exchange rates 
before doing so.
– It allowed EU members outside of the EMU to maintain fxed 
exchange rates if desired.
Theiryu if Optmum Currencyu Areas
• The theory of iptmum currencyu areas (Mundell, 1961) argues that the 
optmal area for a system of fxed exchange rates, or a common currency, is 
one that is highly economically integrated. 
– economic integraton means free fows of
• goods and services (trade)
• fnancial capital (assets) and physical capital
• workers/labor (immigraton and emigraton)
• Fixed exchange rates have costs and benefts for countries deciding whether 
to adhere to them.
– Benefts are that they avoid the uncertainty and internatonal 
transacton costs that foatng exchange rates involve.
– The gain that would occur if a country joined a fxed exchange rate 
system is called the minetaryu efciencyu gain.
Theiryu if Optmum Currencyu Areas (2) 
• The monetary efciency gain depends on the amount of economic 
integraton. 
• Joining fxed exchange rate system would be benefciaa for a country if:
– trad e is extensive between it and member countries, because 
transacton costs would be greatly reduced and the law of one price 
would prevail.
– fnanciaa assets fiw freeayu (no limitatons to capital movements) 
between it and member countries, because the uncertainty about 
rates of return would be greatly reduced.
– peipae migrate freeayu between it and member countries, because the 
uncertainty about the purchasing power of wages would be greatly 
reduced.
Theiryu if Optmum Currencyu Areas (3)
● In order to have monetary efciency gain, the members of the fxed 
exchange rate system would maintain stable prices.
– But when variable infaton exists among member countries, joining 
the system would not reduce uncertainty (as much).
• We have assumed that a new member would be fully commited to a 
fxed exchange rate system.
– But if a new member is likely to leave the fxed exchange rate system, 
then joining the system would not reduce uncertainty (as much).
• The efectveness if a fxed  exchange rate syustem d epend s in cred ibiaityu: 
Cimmin Currencyu, an ind epend ent Centraa Bank, and  the nin-reversibiaityu 
if the d ecisiin are the stringest cimmitment ti maintain stabiaityu.
Theiryu if Optmum Currencyu Areas (4)
• Cists if fxed  exchange rates: loss of monetary policy for stabilizing 
output and employment, and the loss of automatc adjustment of 
exchange rates to changes in relatve aggregate demand.
• Afer joining a fxed exchange rate system, if the new member faces a fall 
in aggregate demand:
– Relatve prices will tend to fall, which will lead other members to 
increase aggregate demand greatly if economic integraton is 
extensive, so that the economic loss (lower aggregate demand and 
output) is not as great. A small price reducton is sufcient to lead 
back quickly to full employment.
– Financial assets or labor will migrate to areas with higher returns or 
wages if economic integraton is extensive, so that the economic loss 
(underemployment of capital and labor) is not as great.
An Increase in Market Uncertaintyu (2)
• When market uncertainty increases, the costs due to stability loss 
increase and, hence, a higher d egree if ecinimic integratin is need ed  
to gain from the currency union.
• Chari, Dovis and Kehoe (2015) propose a counter argument.
• If there is no commitment in monetary policy, a currency area may reduce 
tme inconsistency problems and act as a stabiaizer precisely when formed 
by countries with asymmetric shocks and high output market variability.
– This is the cire pribaem for the EMU afer the fnancial crisis of 2008: 
an asymmetric shock.
– Need to distnguish the impact if the structure (the Euro and the 
ECB) from the impact if minetaryu piaicyu (ECB) and fscaa piaicies 
(member states).
Is the EU an Optmum Currencyu Area? 
• In an optmum currency area we expect that members have a high d egree 
if ecinimic integratin:
– large trade volumes as a fracton of GDP
– a large amount of foreign fnancial investment and foreign direct 
investment relatve to total investment
– a large fracton of labor movement across borders to total labor force
• Most EU members exported from 10% to 20% of GDP to other EU 
members in 1999. It is higher than exports of EU to the U.S.
• But trade between regions in the U.S. is a larger fracton of regional GDP.
• Intra-EU trade increased (as a share of EU GDP) since the Single European 
Act.
Intra-EU Trad e as a % if EU GDP
Is the EU an Optmum Currencyu Area? (2) 
• If EU markets were greatly integrated, then the prices of goods and 
services should be nearly the same across markets (aaw if ine price 
wiuad  hiad )
– There are stll remarkable diferences in prices but the Euro (and e-
commerce) are greatly red ucing d ispersiin.
• Regiinaa migratin is nit extensive in the EU.
– Europe has many languages and cultures, which hinder migraton and 
labor mobility.
– Unions and local regulatons also slow down labor movements 
between industries and countries.
– Diferences of U.S. unemployment rates across regions are smaller 
and less persistent than diferences of natonal unemployment rates 
in the EU, indicatng a lack of EU labor mobility.
Peipae Changing Regiin if Resid ence 
in the 1990s (% if titaa pipuaatin)
• Even within each EU country interregional mobility is lower than in the 
U.S.
• Was Italy an optmum currency area before the euro?
Niminaa Interest Rates
• With the same monetary policy and with German credibility “imported” by 
other euro countries, niminaa interest rates have been the same (and low) 
across euro countries in the 2000s.
• Yet diferent countries had d iferent infatin rates.
– Some (Ireland, UK, Spain) experienced housing bubbles; others (Italy, 
Greece) were highly indebted; changes in unemployment rates were 
asynchronous in diferent labor markets, etc.
• So real interest rates have been slightly diferent (coherently with the 
imperfect asset substtuton theory), but with aimited  spread  up to the 
beginning of the sovereign debt crisis.
• There is evidence that fnancial assets were able to mive mire freeayu within 
the EU afer 1992 and 1999.
• But capital mobility without labor mobility can make the economic stability 
loss greater and spread the costs of asymmetric shocks.
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Germany
Spain
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Portugal
Niminaa Interest Rates in 
Ten Year Bind s (Euri Zine)
Reaa Interest Rates in the Euri Zine
Source: Datastream.
Current Acciunt Baaances if Euri Zine 
Ciuntries, 2005–2009 (% if GDP)
Due higher infaton, PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, 
Spain) appreciated against Germany in real terms and 
experienced trade defcits.
Other Cinsid eratins fir the EMU
• The structure of the economies in the EMU is important for determining 
how members respond to aggregate demand shocks.
– The economies of EU members are similar in the sense that there is a 
high viaume if intra-industry trade relatve to the total volume.
– They are diferent in the sense that Northern European countries have 
high levels of physical capital per worker and more skilled labor, 
compared with Southern European countries.
• The amount of transfers among the EU members may afect how EU 
economies respond to aggregate demand shocks.
– Fiscal payments between countries in the EU’s federal system, or fscaa 
fed eraaism, may help ofset the economic stability loss from joining the 
EMU. However, relatve to inter-regional transfers in the U.S., litle fscal 
federalism occurs among EU members.
The Euripean Sivereign Debt Crisis
• The fnancial crisis in 2008 quickly became a generalized economic 
recession in 2009, spreading globally.
• Public money went to automatc stabilizers and to save the banking 
system (+G)...
• ...and taxes decreased because of the recession (-T) opening huge public 
defcits and accumulatng public debt (B) and its cost (r).
Givernment Defcit = (G – T) + rB
• Cyclical (expansionary) fscal policy that works if it is coordinated with an 
expansionary monetary policy (see the US).
• In 2010 the symmetric recession became an asyummetric path if 
reciveryu: centre vs. periphery.
• Some countries (e.g. Germany) advocated austerity policies to manage 
the Debt crisis and to maintain credibility in the Euro.
• Strong clash with the ECB that since 2011 (Mario Draghi) started a policy 
of quanttatve easing.
The Euripean Sivereign Debt Crisis (2)
The Euripean Sivereign Debt Crisis (3)
The Euripean Sivereign Debt Crisis (4)
The Euripean Sivereign Debt Crisis (5)
The Euripean Sivereign Debt Crisis (6)
• The delay and the contradictons in European economic policy delayed 
credible answers and facilitated specuaatin against the Euri.
• Debt pribaem in Greece was (is) the most important issue:
– Rising govt debt twinned with revelatons that Greece had 
misreported its fnances in earlier years to join the Euro, led to a 
downgrade of Greek bonds, interest rates shot up as markets worried 
that Greece might default.
• Repercussions throughout Europe:
– Many European banks held Greek bonds, whose falling values pushed 
them toward bankruptcy.  
– Policymakers worried that banks would fail, causing a cred it crunch 
and economic downturn.
The Euripean Sivereign Debt Crisis (7)
• Baiaing iut Greece:  
– The EC, ECB and IMF ofered loans to Greece to prevent an immediate 
default. The loans came with conditons that Greece enact austerity 
measures to improve its fnances.  
– Taxpayers in countries providing the funds resented the bailout.
– Greek citzens resented the austerity measures and riotng ensued. 
Social default vs. economic default.
– A partaa d efauat if the d ebt came late, insufcient and did not 
restore stability. A further sign of weakness.
• Speculaton quickly moved to other countries with problems:
– Many feared a Greek default would lead to a run on bonds from 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy, leading to the end of the Euro.
– SuperMario speech at the City “Whatever it takes” to save the Euro 
and to reduce the spreads.
The ECB Minetaryu Piaicyu
• Under Draghi guidance, expansionary monetary policy based on: 
– Cheap credit to banks (for 3 years) through LTRO (Ling Term 
Refnancing Operatins) for 1 trillion euros in 2011 and 2012.
– Help to countries with excessively high bond yields through OMT 
(Outright Minetaryu Transactins: sovereign bond indirect purchases) 
announced in 2012
– TLTRO (Targeted  LTRO), conditonal on banks’ lending to non-fnancial 
private sector (except for housing) announced in 2014
– ESM (Euripean Stabiaityu Mechanism): Permanent rescue fund 
created in 2012 to help bailout of banks and other systemic fnancial 
insttutons.
• These might be infatinaryu piaicies but: a) a bit of infaton is thought to be 
beter than recession; b) infaton was and stll is below the ECB target of 2%.
The EU Fiscaa Piaicyu
• The Fiscaa Cimpact: the new Stability Pact
– Internatonal treates signed in 2012 by EU states (but Czech Republic 
and UK opted out) to correct and enhance the Stability Pact.
– Balanced budget rule: structuraa d efcit/GDP < 0.5% (1% for countries 
with debt/GDP < 60%)
• Italy and other countries have amended the consttuton 
accordingly
– Debt brake ruae: Debt reducton toward 60% of GDP has to be 
accomplished in 20 years.
– Automatc procedures and penaltes for noncompliers
• Incoherence between fscal and monetary policies, clashes between 
member states, asymmetric economic dynamics, weak politcal power of the 
EU.
The future if the EU and  if the EMU
• The crisis showed the aimits if the Euripean architecture: a) too much 
importance to automatc stabilizers; b) centralizaton of monetary policy 
and decentralizaton of fscal policy does not work when there is 
asymmetry in the economic dynamics; c) complexity of the policy decision 
mechanisms implies delays and less efciency.
• The only way out is the United  States if Euripe:
– Fiscaa Uniin: a federal fscal policy with power to sell Eurobonds;
– Piaitcaa Uniin: an efcient and democratc federal government;
– Bank Uniin: a unique system of governance for European Banks and 
fnancial insttutons:
• The alternatve? The EU disgregaton and a politcal victory for the US, 
Russia and China.
